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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of political uncertainty on the recent financial crises in
emerging markets.  By examining political election cycles, we find that eight out of nine of the
recent financial crises happened during periods of political election and transition.  Using a
combination of probit and switching regression analysis, we find that there is a significant
relationship between political election and financial crisis after controlling for differences in
economic and financial conditions.  We observe increased market volatility during political
election and transition periods.  Moreover, we have some evidence that political risk is more
important in explaining financial crisis than market contagion. Our results suggest that political
uncertainty could be a major contributing factor to financial crisis.  Thus, politics does matter in
emerging markets.  Since the odds of financial crisis tend to be much larger during the political
election periods, institutonal investors should take that into account when making emerging
market investment during those time periods.
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2What caused financial crises in Latin America in 1995 and in Asia in 1997?  Why is market
volatility so high in emerging markets?  Most attempts to explain currency and equity market
volatility using economic and financial variables left much to be explained.  In a recent
comprehensive study, Radelet and Sachs (1998) find that economic and financial conditions
explain about 24-37% of the recent financial crises.  Frankel and Froot (1990) have summarized
the failure of existing literature to capture currency market movements even after the fact: "It is
now widely accepted that standard observable macroeconomic variables are not capable of
explaining, much less predicting ex ante, the majority of short term changes in the exchange rate".
While it is possible that some important macroeconomic variables are missing in current
models, it is also plausible that some non-economic variables could contribute to financial crisis.
While there have been a large literature on the impact of political process on monetary policy and
business cycles (see, for example, Alesina (1987), Alesina and Sachs (1988), and Alesina and
Cukierman (1990)), few have studied the impact of political risks on financial markets until
recently.  A recent study by Bittlingmayer (1998) found a significant impact of political
uncertainty on recession and market volatility.  Willard, Guinnane, and Rosen (1996) discovered
some significant evidence that turning points in the U.S. Civil War was reflected in the price of the
Greenbacks.  Erb, Harvey and Viskanta (1996) also found a significant relationship between
equity market volatility and political risk as measured by ICRG political risk ratings.  (See also
Bailey and Chung (1995).  The impact of political risk on financial markets is not conclusive,
however, since earlier studies by Cutler (1988) and Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1989) found
little evidence of political news having a significant impact on the U.S. market.2  Moreover, there
is little empirical study on the impact of political risk on financial crisis in emerging markets.
                    
2 Incidentally, the positive evidence on political risk by Bittlingmayer
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3This paper studies the impact of political risk on financial crisis by examing political
election cycles.  It makes three contributions to the literature of currency crisis and equity market
volatility.  First, we find a significant relationship between political election cycles and financial
crises. We discover that eight out of nine of the recent financial crises happened during period of
political election and transition.  Second,  we identify a new source of political uncertainty--
political elections--which tend to increase volatility  in emerging markets.  This enriches the
stories of Bittlingmayer (1998) and Erb, Harvey and Viskanta (1996) who use other
sources/measures of  political uncertainty.  Third, the paper uses the theories of currency crisis
and contingent investment to forge a link between political risk and financial crisis.  Using models
of currency crisis, we argue that political elections tend to: a) create strong incentive for
governments to pursue policies inconsistent with fixed currency regime, b) create doubt about
government's commitment to stable exchange rate policy, and c) deter foreign investment due to
policy uncertainty.
While the paper is based on the analytical framework developed by Redalet and Sachs
(1998), we extended their work in two different directions: first, we analyzed the effect of
political risk and market contagion on financial crisis in addition to the economic variables
examined in their model.  Second, in addition to financial crisis, we also examine currency
valuation, stock market returns and market volatility in emerging markets.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section I start by outlining several models of
currency crisis and proceeds with theoretical discussions of possible political effects on financial
crisis. Section I constructs the political dummy variable that describe different periods in a
political election cycle.  It also provides a description of the various variables we use to control
for different economic conditions across emerging markets. Section III begins with a probit
analysis of financial crisis.  It then employs a regression study to examine the impact of political
elections on currency devaluation, equity returns, and market volatility.  It further provides a
4switching regression analysis, which allows model parameters to vary over different political
periods. Finally, Section IV concludes.
I.  Political Uncertainty and Financial Crisis
While political uncertainty takes many different shapes and forms, such as changes in the
government and changes in its domestic and foreign policy, this paper focuses on one particular
kind of political uncertainty, which is associated with national elections.  In a democratic system,
national elections  are a major political events for re-distribution of political power, which has
imporatnt implications for the future political and economic course of a country.  As a result, it
presents a major uncertainty to both domestic and foreign investors.3  Why would political
uncertainty during election period contribute to currency crisis?  While there are many ways
political uncertainty can affect currency values, several economic models may shed light on the
mechanism through which political uncertainty can help trigger or exacerbate a financial crisis:
                    
3 While the same statement can be made for developed as well as emerging
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5The first is the so-called "first generation" currency crisis model represented by Krugman
(1979) and Flood and Garber (1984).  In their models, the government uses its money printing
machine to finance a budget deficit while also trying to maintain fixed exchange rates by using a
fixed stock of exchange reserves.  Foresighted speculators, recognizing this unsustainable
conflicting policies, launch a speculative attack, which quickly exhaust the country's reserves and
force an abandonment of the fixed exchange rate.  Within such models, one can see that crisis is
more likely to happen during elections, since this is when a democratically elected government
would have the strongest incentive to engage in the following inconsistent policies.  To appease
voters, the government would pursue expansionary monetary and fiscal policies to hold down
unemployment.   But they would also try to have exchange rates fixed to ensure price stability or
other policy objectives.  As a result, currency crises are more likely to happen during political
elections or during the post election transition when the country's reserves are likely to be
exhausted due to currency market interventions.
In the so-called "second generation" model of Obstfeld (1994), there is a tension between
the government's desire to abandon its fixed exchange rate on one hand and its desire to defend its
the exchange rate on the other.  The reason the government may like to depreciate its currency
could be due to a large domestic debt burden or high unemployment rate.  As a result, it may be
tempted to inflate away the debt burden or to pursue a more expansionary monetary policy by
abandoning the fixed rate.  In such a model, the cost of defending the currency increases when
people suspect that the government is leaning towards abandoning the fixed rate.  Given the
strong temptation for re-election, foreign and domestic speculators may perceive a strongest
government tilt towards expansionary policies while being reluctant to take costly policy actions
to defend the currency during elections.4  As a result, they will sell the currency thus making it
more costly for the government to defend the currency, and the increasing difficulty in defending
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6the currency would in turn convinces more people to sell. 5 Thus,  political election could affect
investor expectation and change market behavior.
A related class of crisis model is that of self-fulfilling exchange rate crises (see, for
example, Banerjee (1992)).  In such a model, an individual investor will not pull his money out of
the country if he believes that the currency is unlikely to devalue, but he will do so if a currency
drop seems likely.  A crisis, however, will happen if many individual investors do pull out.  As a
result, either optimism or pessimism will be self-confirming.  It worth noting that countries with
strong fundamentals and high credibility are unlikely to be subject to investor pessimism. It is only
when fundamentals are sufficiently weak that the country is vulnerable to speculative attack.  This
could happen due to either a deteriorating government fiscal position or a percep  of lack of
political commitment to the fixed rate regime or other factors.6  As pointed in the above
discussion, political election may very well change that perception.
While the above analysis emphases the role of government policy and the psychology of
investors in currency markets, models of contingent investment or "real options" suggest political
uncertainty may also affect real investment decisions.7 Since most foreign direct investment are to
a large extent irreversible, foreign investors may choose to delay their investment amid increasing
political uncertainty (e.g. change in tax policy, foreign ownership restrictions, protection of
                    
5 One can see here that country with poor banking systems makes it much harder
for the government to defend its currency, since the resulting high interest
rates could put the banking system in danger.
6 It is widely reported that the wavering positions of the Korean presidential
candidates on the IMF package contributed to sharp drops in the Korean won.
Likewise, the wavering position of President Suharto on the IMF package also
contributed to further instability in the rupiah. (see Financial Times,
Decemer 1997 and January 1999)
7 See, for example, Bernanke (1983) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
7ownership rights, etc.).8  The higher the political uncertainty, the more it pays to delay the
investment.  Thus, reducing the demand for local currency in emerging markets and slow down
growth.  This view is supported by the study of Bittlingmayer (1998), who shows that political
risk increase market volatility and reduce investment and real output.
While the above models outlined different mechanisms through which political uncertainty
could affect currency crisis, in reality, a crisis may proceed with a complex interaction of many
different factors and political uncertainty could affect financial crisis through a mixture of all the
above mechanisms, with different mechanisms perhaps playing a different role at different stages
of the crisis.  The objective of this paper is not to distinguish among different competing models
of currency crisis but rather to ascertain that political uncertainty does play a role in currency
crisis after adjusting for difference in economic and financial conditions.
II. Data and Summary Statistics
While political uncertainty takes many different shapes and forms, such as, revolution,
changes in elected government and changes in its domestic and foreign policy, this paper focuses
on one particular kind of political uncertainty, which is associated with national elections.   We
divide a country's election cycle into two periods: a) the time leading up to an election and the
time of government transition after the election, and b) the time after the transition is complete
and the next election season starts.
To construct our dummy variables of political elections, we first group countries
according to presidential or parliamentary systems.  We pick those elections by which leaders of
national government are determined.  For presidential system, the period (year) of political
election and transition is defined based on presidential elections.  For parliamentary system, the
political year is based on the election of the representatives.  If the election is held in the first half
                    
8 This uncertainty could be the result of politicians' deliberate hiding their
true policy positions. (see Alesina and Cukierman (1990))
8of the year t, we will set the political dummy to be 1 for year t and t-1. If the election is held in the
second half of the year t, we will set the political dummy to be 1 for year t and t+1.9  This is to
allow for a minimum of 6-month election period and 6 month transition period for our annual
sample.   It is worth noting that this study only includes those elections planned for in advance
according to election cycles determined by the country's constitution.  As a result, it does not
include unscheduled elections.10  Table 1 provides a summery of when elections were held for the
countries in the sample, their political (presidential or parliamentary) systems, and the length of
election cycles.  One can see that eight out of nine financial crisis happened within one year before
or after the election.
To control for differences in a country's economic and financial conditions, we employ the
same set of risk indicators used in Redalet and Sachs (1998) (RS thereafter) in their model of
financial crisis in emerging markets during the period 1994 - 97.11  We then add our political
dummy variable to their vector of economic and institutional variables and proceed to estimate a
probit model.  To further control for the effects of market contagion, we also add a regional
contagion variable to their probit analysis.  We use the same panel data for the years 1994-1997
from 22 emerging markets.  The dependent variable is a 0-1 indicator, equal to 1 if country fell
into financial crisis, defined as a sharp shift from capital inflow to outflow between year t-1 and t.
According to the definition, the sample has nine cases of financial crises: Turkey and Venezuela in
1994, Argentina and Mexico in 1995; and Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Thailand in 1997.  After a crisis has occurred, subsequent observations of the country are
                    
9 The only exception to this rule is that of Jordon, where the former King
Hussain had ruled the country for several decades.
10 The rationale here is that un-scheduled elections are often due to a
political crisis, which could be endogenous to economic events. In this paper,
we only include those political elections pre-determined by the country's
constitution, thus, they can be viewed as exogenous.
11 While one may be tempted to extend the sample to cover a longer time
periods, data on some of the economic variables are not available for some
countries.
9dropped, since a true reversal from inflow to outflow can only be supposed to happen once during
the sample period.  Thus, observations for Turkey and Venezuela in 1995-1997, for Argentina
and Mexico in 1996-97 are not included in the sample.  As a result, 78 observations (22 x 4 - 10
excluded observations) are used in the probit study.12  (For details, see RS.) To examine the
impact of political uncertainty on equity returns and market volatility, we also collect the return
series (in dollars) from the IFC index.  The annual volatility is computed from standard deviation
of the monthly dollar return series.13
Among the economic variables used in RS, two variables measure a country's leverage.
According to one hypothesis of financial market instability (see Krugman (1979), (1998)),
countries with a high ratio of short-term debt to short-term assets (measured as the ratio of short-
term debt to the foreign exchange reserves) would be more vulnerable to crisis.  A high ratio of
short-term debt to reserves makes it hard for the country to pay off all short-term creditors in the
event of a panic. Thus, the country is more vulnerable to a confidence crisis.  An alternative
hypothesis is that financial crisis is caused by fundamental solvency rather than liquidity.  Thus,
total debt outstanding (long and short term) would matter more than short-term debt.  To test
these two hypotheses, a second variable of total foreign debt to reserves ratio is used.  The data
source is Bank of International Settlement.  Here, short-term and long-term debts are taken at the
end of the previous year.
Recent study of financial crisis in emerging markets also indicates a high concurrence of
banking crisis and currency crisis (see Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998)).  The theory is that
countries with a rapid build-up in bank credit would have more fragile banking systems due to a
                    
12 We are grateful to Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs for providing us with
the data set.
13 Since the IFC index for Russia only covers part of the sample, we use the
Russia AKM Composite Price Index instead.  The IFC index for South Africa
starts in January 1994. As a result, the anual volatility for 1994 is based on
standard deviation of the monthly return series from Feb. to Dec. 1994.
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likely greater quantity of bad loans.  As a result, the central bank can hardly afford the traditional
currency defense by raising interest rates, since doing so would push many domestic banks into
bankruptcy.  Therefore, we expect that countries with sharply rising financial sector claims
relative to GDP would be more vulnerable to financial crisis.  Here, the variables used are the
change in the ratio of the financial system claims on the private sector relative to GDP over the
preceding three years.  Our study has also included two balance of payment variables as in RS:
current account to GDP ratio and capital flow to GDP ratio, since it is often claimed that large
current account deficits financed by huge capital inflow are unsustainable.  It is worth noting here
that current account and capital flow are lagged by a year
Two other economic variables are also examined in the study.  One is the percentage
change in the real exchange rate (RER) in the previous three years.  A negative RER indicates a
real appreciation.  A sharp appreciation in real exchange rate could lead to deteriorating trade
balance, potential loss of foreign exchange reserves and thus may increase the likelihood of crisis.
The other is a cross-country comparative index of corruption provided by the PRS Group.  The
corruption index is measured on a scale of 1 to 6, with 1 indicating the most corrupt, and 6 the
least corrupt.  We use the variable to test the hypothesis that corruption (and crony capitalism)
was an major underlying cause of financial crisis.
In addition to the above economic and financial variables, we have also included a market
contagion dummy to measure the impact of the so called "Domino effect", which has been widely
cited for contributing to the spread of the Thai financial crisis.  To measure this effect, we have
constructed two contagion dummies, one regional and one global.  The regional contagion
dummy takes the value of one if one of the country in the region has a financial crisis during the
year and zero otherwise.  The only exception to this rule is that we set the dummy to be zero for
the first "Domino" countries, such as Thailand in 1997 and Mexico in 1995, since their crises were
certainly not triggered by contagion.14  By the same rule, the global contagion dummy takes the
                    
14 Alternatively, we can also set the dummy to be one if one of the countries
in the sample has a financial crisis during the current and previous years.
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value of one if one of the country in the world has a financial crisis during the year and zero
otherwise.
To further our understanding of the data set, Table 2 presents some summary statistics
according to financial crisis.  The top panel gives the crisis countries, their economic conditions,
their equity and currency market performance, and the years when financial crisis happened.  The
last column of the panel indicates that eight out of nine of the financial crises happened during the
political years.  In comparison, only five out of the nine crises were under the influence of regional
contagion.15  A simple t-test suggests that crises countries did enter the crisis with significantly
higher current account deficit, higher capital inflows, larger change in bank credit in the past three
years, and higher short-term debt to GDP ratios (see, for example, Malaysia, Mexico, Thailand).
However, these simple t-tests, while suggestive, have not controlled for the impact of other
variables.
Table 3 reports the correlation matrix for the variables used in the study.  We can see a
relatively high degree of correlation between the political dummy and financial crisis.  Not
surprisingly, the political dummy was also negatively correlated with changes in currency value.
There seems to be a relatively high positive correlation between the political dummy and lagged
capital inflow.16   Table 3 also indicates the presence of a relatively high correlation between the
regional contagion dummy and financial crisis, but the correlation was smaller comparing to
                                                                 
However, given the fact that financial crises are rather rare events and most
countries did not suffer from financial crisis during the sample period, this
defination would significantly reduce the explanatory power of the contagion
variable.
15 While some people may attribute the 1994-1995 Mexico crisis to a regional
contagion effect from Venezuela, it is worth noting that the same logic would
also apply to Brazil, Chile and other countries in the region in 1996, which
did not suffer from financial crises.  In other words, attributing the Mexico
crisis to contagion from Venezuela would only weaken the contagion story.
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political risks (0.28 vs. 0.32).17  What is interesting is that there appeared to be a positive
correlation between political cycles and contagion effects.  Thus, it is possible to mistake political
effects for contagion effects and vice versa.
II. Empirical Analysis
A.  A Probit Analysis of Emerging Market Crises
 To disentangle the impact of economic and political factors on financial crisis, we perform
a probit study similar to that of RS.  Following RS, we use the same set of economic and financial
variables in the model specification. In addition, we add the political and market contagion
dummy variables.  The model is specified as follows:
iiii cDbXaY e+++=                           (1)
Here Yi is the indicator variable for financial crisis. Yi is set to equal 1 if crisis occurs and 0
otherwise. Xi is a vector of economic and financial variables for the country in the sample. Di is a
political dummy variable as defined in section II according to a country's political election cycle.
By estimating equation (1), we can examine the impact of political election on financial crisis by
controlling for differences in economic conditions.
The results are shown in Table 4.  As expected, the political dummy variable is highly
significant at 5% level in most specifications.  This should not be surprising, since Table 2 also
                                                                 
16 A simple Pearson test suggests the above mentioned correlations are all
statistically significant.
17 The correlation using global contagion dummy was only 0.10, much less
important than the regional dummy. The results were also similar for Tables 4-
6. As a result, we only report the results for the regional contagion dummy.
These results are available upon request.
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indicates that that eight out of nine of the financial crises happened during the political years.
What is interesting here is that the political dummy turns out to be quite significant even after
adjusting for differences in economic and financial conditions.  Moreover, the inclusion of the
political dummy has greatly increased the pseudo R-square explained by the probit model.  While
the maximum pseudo R-square in RS was 0.37 with six independent variables, our first
specification in Table 4 obtained a pseudo R-square of 0.63 with only four independent
variables.18  To test the hypothesis that a presidential system may have a different impact on
financial crisis compared to parliamentary system, we also include a parliamentary dummy in the
probit analysis.  The difference appears to be insignificant.
Our study also confirms the following result of RS, after controlling for political
uncertainty:  First, a higher ratio of short-term debt to reserves is strongly associated with the
onset of a crisis.  The estimated coefficient is positive and significant at the 5% level in each
specification.  The level of total debt, by contrast, is not statistically associated with a crisis.  As
pointed out by RS, "this evidence strongly suggests that these crises are indeed crises of liquidity,
not solvency".   Second, a rapid buildup in the claims of the banking sector is found to be
associated with crises.  The estimated coefficient is positive and significant at the 5% level in all
specifications.  Thus, the evidence appears to support the notion that rapid buildup of bank claims
weakens the financial system and makes the country more vulnerable to a financial crisis.19
Third, a larger current account deficit or capital flows are only weakly associated with the
onset of a crisis.  We also find that the measure of real exchange rate valuation does not seem to
be associated with a financial crisis.  As we can see from Table 4, the estimated coefficient on the
change in the real exchange rate is close to zero and is insignificant in both specifications.  This is
                    
18 By adding the plus political dummy, the pseudo R-square jumped to 0.88
using the same six independent variables as RS.
19 It is worth noting, however, in the cases of Mexico in 1995 and Indonesia
in 1997, the short-term debt problems lay mostly outside of the banking
system.  
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confirmed in Table 3, as there is almost no correlation between real exchange rate and financial
crisis and the difference in the mean in the real exchange rate between the crisis (-15.8%) and
non-crisis samples (-15.9%) is negligible.  (Note: The negative sign indicates an appreciation.)
Fourth, the level of corruption is not significantly associated with fin ncial crises, even after
controlling for political uncertainty and other financial variables.  While a high corruption level
may affect a country’s economic efficiency, the coefficient is not significant at conventional levels.
The difference in the level of perceived corruption in the crisis and non-crisis countries are fairly
small.  For the non-crisis economies, the corruption index averaged 3.6 (a measure of 6 is the
least corrupt); in the crisis economies the average was 3.2.  As pointed out by Redalet and Sachs
(1998),  "Yes, there is extensive corruption in East Asia, but also in other emerging markets that
did not fall prey to crisis.  Corruption does not seem to be the driving force of the crisis."
Finally, Table 5 also examined the relative importance of political risk and market
contagion in financial crisis.  The results are reported in the last two columns. Using the same
number of economic variables as in column 1, the result in column 7 indicates that the impact of
market contagion is significant, but the effect is not as important as political risk, since the pseudo
R-square for market contagion is lower (0.51 vs. 0.63).  Using both political risk and contagion,
the result in column 8 further confirms that political risk is more significant than market contagion
in explaining financial crises.  It also indicates that the “domino effect” is much less important than
many people thought.
B. Impact of Political Uncertainty on Currency Devaluation, Equity Returns, and Market
Volatility
While the probit analysis has found significant impact of political uncertainty on financial
crisis, critics may argue that the evidence is quite limited due to the fact that there were only nine
financial crises in the sample.  As a result, there are not enough variations in the dependent
variable.  Moreover, other economies may also suffer sharp currency devaluations without having
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a financial crisis as defined by RS as a total reversal of capital inflows.  To see how the political
and economic variables would affect currency value, we regress the percentage changes in the
currency value (in dollars) on the same set of political and economic variables in Table 4.  As we
can see from the first column of Table 5, among all the economic variables, only change in bank
credit has a very significant negative impact on currency value.  The estimated coefficient is
significant at the 1% level.  (The t-statistics have been adjusted for heteroscedaticity using the
White heteroscedasticity-consistent matrix.)  Thus, the evidence appears to support the notion
that a rapid buildup of bank claims weakens the financial system and may lead to currency
devaluation.  We can also see that the currency values tend to go down on average 6.4% during
election or transition years.  The estimated coefficient for market contagion, however, is not
significant.  Thus, the evidence is consistent with the view that emerging market currencies are
more likely to be devalued during period of political election and transition.
The second column of Table 5 provides a simple regression analysis of equity market
returns in dollars.  We find that a high current account (surplus) is associated with high equity
market returns.  But a high capital flow to GDP ratio from the previous year appears to imply
lower equity market returns, possibly due to the likely reversal of capital flows. We also find that
positive changes in real exchange rates (currency devaluation) in the past and high short-term debt
to GDP ratio tend to dampen equity market dollar returns.  Moreover, we find that market
contagion has a negative significant impact on equity return.  While the regression has a fairly high
explanatory power (adjusted R-square), one needs to be careful in interpreting the result.
Although all variables used in the regression are information from previous years (with the only
exception of market contagion), market participants would not be able to obtain them at the
beginning of the current year due to significant time lags.  As a result, while the regression may
help explain what had happened and what were likely contributing factors, it is not very useful for
forecasting equity market returns due to information lags.
The third column of Table 6 provides a simple regression analysis on the volatility of
monthly equity market returns in dollars.  We find that a large change in bank credit has a very
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significant impact on market volatility.  We also discover that negative changes in real exchange
rates (currency appreciation, possibly overvaluation) tend to increase market volatility.  Finally,
we find strong evidence that suggests that volatilities (based on dollar returns) on average tend to
be 3.2% higher during period of political election and transition.  The estimated coefficient is
highly significant at the 1% level after adjusting for heteroscedasticity.  Measures of foreign
borrowing (either the total stock of debt, or the current account deficit), corruption, and market
contagion, however, were not important.  To make sure that our volatility results are not driven
by currency movement, we also performed the above analysis using the volatility of monthly
equity market returns in local currencies.  The results are very similar.  As a matter of fact,
monthly volatilities (based on local currency returns) on average tended to be 4% higher during
period of political election and transition.20  Thus, we conclude, uncertainty associated with
political election and transition has a significant impact on equity market volatility.
The evidence of political election on market volatility provides one of the missing pieces in
the volatility literature, since there has been little empirical study on the effects of political factors
on stock prices and volatilities until recently.  Instead, most previous studies focus on the impact
of economic events on stock prices-- it is perhaps no wonder, then, that many researchers find
that a large fraction of significant market movements and volatility are difficult to explain (See
Roll (1988),  Fama (1990), and Schwert (1989)).  Recent work by Bittlingmayer (1998),
however, suggests a close relationship between political risk and market volatility during the
transition from Imperial to Weimar Germany.  Erb, Harvey and Viskanta (1996) also discover a
positive relationship between political risk indicators and market volatility in emerging markets.
Kim and Mei (1995) also find a close relationship between political risk in Hong Kong and its
market volatility.  This paper enriches the above stories by adding a new source of political
uncertainty that is associated with political election and transition.  It provides an additional lead
to the understanding of variance dynamics as to why volatility differs across countries and why
volatility shifts through time.
                    
20 These results are available upon request.
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C. A Switching Regression Analysis
Studies such as Bakaert and Harvey (1995) shows that the expected equity return and
market volatility in emerging markets tend to vary over time.  The Lucas critique also suggests
that market participants (thus asset pricing) may behave differently under different economic
environment.  This implies that the parameters of the reduced-form regression in the above
section may vary in different political periods, since market participants may alter their behavior
under different political risk environments.  Thus, one could argue that it is more appropriate to
use a switching regression model with different coefficients under different political periods:
iii XbaY e++= 00    under political years,                                     (2)
iii XbaY e++= 11    under non-political years.                               (3)
It is easy to show that the above regressions is equivalent to the following linear regression with
political dummy variables:
iiiiii DXdDcXbaY e++++= 1100                  (4)
where c1=a1-a0 and d1=b1-b0.  To reduce the large number of parameters in equation (4), we only
take those variables that are significant in Table 5 to be included in the regressions.  The results
are presented in Table 6.  We can see from the first two columns of the table, there is little
evidence that the coefficients of the first two regressions change significantly under different
political periods, since most coefficients of c1 and d1 are not statistically different from zero.
There is evidence, however, that the coefficients of the volatility regressions have changed under
different political periods, since c1 is positive and highly significant. 21   But the d1's are not
                    
21 Another exception is that currency devaluation in the past tended to help
equity dollar returns during the political years.  Our explanation is that,
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statistically different from zero.  This suggests that, while political periods may have a significant
impact on the level of market volatility, it does not seem to affect the way by which other
economic variables impact market volatility.
IV.  Caveats and Conclusions
While the paper provides a systematic approach to evaluate the imp ct of political
elections on currency values and market volatility, there is no formal structural model underlying
our econometric analysis.  The paper only covers the last four years from 1994-1997.  There
might also be significant measurement errors in variables used.  And yet, the results are quite
informative.  We have found that there is a significant relationship between political uncertainty
and financial crises after controlling for market contagion and differences in economic conditions.
We have also discovered increased market volatility during political election and transition
periods.  We further confirmed the result of Radelet and Sachs (1998) that the defining element of
financial crises is the vulnerability to panic, as measured by high levels of short-term debt to
reserves.  Another important predictor of crisis is the rapid buildup of bank claims.
Our results about political risk have a few interesting practical applications: First, our
analysis suggests that emerging market governments should increase their vigilance against
financial crisis during political election and transition periods.22  Secon , investors should note
that the odds of financial crisis tend to be much larger during the political election periods.  Thus,
proper protection or risk adjustment needs to be taken when making emerging market investment
during  those time periods.  It is worth noting, however, political election does not necessarily
                                                                 
while a recent currency devaluation tend to dampen equity returns in general,
possibly due to market momentum, a currency devaluation before the political
years may reduce the risk of financial crisis.
22 The IMF board approved a US$4.2 credit for Mexico on July 6, 1999 “in the
hopes safegaurding the country against a currency crisis during next year’s
presidential election… Financial crises have ocurred in Mexico during each
presidential transition since 1976.” New York Times, July 7, 1999.
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lead to financial crisis.23  Thus, we would like to caution against using the result as a simple “sure-
win” investment strategy.  Third, the pricing of emerging market derivatives should not be based
on assumption of constant market volatility.  As a matter of fact, market volatility tends to be
much higher during political election and transition periods.
Our work also has made a contribution to the increasing literature of market volatility
studies.   By focusing on relatively exogenous political shocks in Germany during the pre-war
period, Bittlingmayer (1998) has established a link from political uncertainty to market volatility
and economic recession.  This paper shows that, exogenous political events,24  su h as pre-
determined election cycles, also impact market volatility and exchange rates.  However, the study
here is quite limited in the sense that we have only captured the most basic type of political
uncertainty related to political elections.  More detailed study on the nature of political
uncertainty (such as the likelihood of election surprises, differences in economic policy of different
parties, and risk of political turmoil), could help us better relate political risk to financial crisis.
Future work in the area could also benefit from daily stock prices and currency rates.  Higher
frequency data would allow better estimates of market reaction to particular political events and
hopefully a clearer identification of the source of market volatility in emerging markets.25  We
believe that this would help us better understand the extreme volatility in emerging markets and
their contagious effects.
                    
23 For example, the 1996 presidential election in Taiwan did not trigger a
currency crisis due to huge reserves and a realtively healthy economy.
24 Strictly speaking, a stable democracy can not be built on total economic
chaos.  Thus, the election cycles studied in the paper are not completely
exogenous to economic conditions.
25 See Kim and Mei (1995) on the relationship between political risk and price
jumps in the Hong Kong stock market.
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Table 1: Summary of Financial Crisis Year, Election Date,
Political System, and Election Cycle







Argentina 1995 May-95 1 4
Brazil Nov-94 1 4
Chile Dec-93 1 6
Colombia May-94 1 4
Hungary May-94 0 4
India Apr-96 0 5
Indonesia 1997 Mar-98 1 5
Jordan Monarch
Korea 1997 Dec-97 1 5
Malaysia 1997 Apr-95 0 4
Mexico 1995 Aug-94 1 6
Peru Apr-95 1 5
Philippines 1997 May-98 1 6
Poland Nov-95 1 5
Russia Jul-96 1 4
South Africa May-94 1 5
Sri Lanka Nov-94 1 6
Taiwan Mar-96 1 4
Thailand 1997 Nov-96 0 4
Turkey* 1994 93 & 95 0 5
Venezuela 1994 Dec-93 1 5
Zimbabwe Mar-96 1 6
Note: 1=Presidential System. * Turkey has a parliamental system with a strong president.
Data Source: Microsoft Encarta Encyclopedia and CIA Factbook (obtained at WEB
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/country-frame.html)
24
Table 4. Probit Results for Financial Crisis
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
Output
Probit results I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Independent variable Coefficient  (Z stat)
Short term debt/ Reserves 0.543 2.501 0.538 0.590 2.201 0.353 0.639 0.579
(2.12)** (1.96)** (2.04)** (2.05)** (1.70)* (1.76)* (2.66)*** (2.23)**
Credit Expansion/GDP 3.774 4.147 4.152 3.967 5.178 2.145 2.610 3.174
(2.51)** (2.51)** (2.51)** (2.55)** (2.35)** (2.03)** (1.76)* (2.03)**
Total debt/reserves -1.071 -0.820
(-1.55) (-1.08)
Capital inflow/GDP 3.203 1.923 3.653 3.357 -6.108
(1.63) (0.55) (1.82)* (1.81)* (-0.98)
Current acct surplus/GDP -26.91
(-1.67)*






Political risk 1.486 1.589 1.506 1.420 2.287 1.574 1.308





Constant -3.483 -3.662 -3.675 -2.302 -3.041 -2.997 -2.809 -3.599
(-3.98)***(-3.68)***(-3.77)***(-1.74)* (-1.57) (-3.83)***(-4.86)***(-4.02)***
Pseudo Rsquared 0.63 0.86 0.64 0.65 0.88 0.56 0.51 0.62
No. of obs 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
Data Sources: The political dummy variables are based on information provided in World
Factbook published by CIA and confirmed by Microsoft's Encarta World Encyclopedia.  Radelet
and Sachs (1998) provided the economic variables and crisis definition. (*** ind cates 1%
significance, ** indicates 5% significance, * indicates 10% significance).
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Table 5: Regression Analysis of Determinants of Currency
Devaluation, Equity Returns (in Dollars) and Market Volatility
______________________________________________________________________________








Constant -0.092 0.134 0.058
(-1.06) (0.60) (2.20)**
Current Account to GDP 0.541 3.972 0.177
(0.99) (2.94)*** (1.19)
Capital Inflow to GDP 0.364 -1.114 -0.068
(1.64) (-1.89)* (-1.16)
Corrupt Index 0.018 0.036 0.005
(0.89) (0.56) (0.66)
Credit Expansion to GDP -0.220 0.442 0.049
(-3.02)*** (1.01) (2.66)***
3 year % change Real FX rate -0.000 -0.005 -0.000
(-0.31) (-2.19)** (-2.04)**
Short-term debt to GDP -0.026 -0.091 0.006
(-1.15) (-1.94)* (1.07)
Total debt to reserve ratio -0.007 -0.009 -0.002
(-1.22) (-0.77) (-1.33)
Political Dummy -0.064 0.045 0.031
(-1.87)* (0.47) (3.74)***
Contagion -0.072 -0.215 0.003
(1.38) (-1.91)* (0.33)
Adjusted R-square 0.196 0.571 0.403
No. of obs 78 78 78
______________________________________________________________________________
Data Sources: The political dummy variables are based on information provided in World
Factbook published by CIA and confirmed by Microsoft's Encarta World Encyclopedia.  Radelet
and Sachs (1998) provided the economic and financial variables. The t-statistics have been
adjusted for heteroscadaticity using the White-matrix. (*** indicates 1% significance, ** indicates
5% significance, * indicates 10% significance).
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Table 6: Switching Regression Analysis of the Determinants of Currency
Devaluation, Equity Returns (in Dollars) and Market Volatility
_________________________________________________________________________








Constant -0.091 0.574 0.061
(-5.80)*** (3.98)*** (7.21)***
Current Account to GDP 4.380
(2.68)***
Capital Inflow to GDP 0.353 -1.682
(6.87)*** (-2.56)**
Credit Expansion to GDP -0.086 0.000 0.114
(-1.13) (0.14) (2.28)**








Capital Inflow*Political -0.213 0.312
(-0.55) (0.27)
Change in credit*Political -0.564 -0.006 -0.111
(-1.31) -1.30 (-1.29)




Adjusted R-square 0.214 0.607 0.298
No. of obs 78 78 78
_________________________________________________________________________
Note:  The t-statistics have been adjusted for heteroscedaticity using the White-matrix. (***
indicates 1% significance, ** indicates 5% significance, * indicates 10% significance).  











































Argentina -0.04 0.07 3.00 0.06 -25.66 1.57 2.74 12.7% 0.1% 10.6% 1 1 1995
Indonesia -0.04 0.06 2.00 0.07 -8.22 1.70 2.89 -73.7% -46.0% 16.5% 1 1 1997
Korea -0.05 0.05 4.00 0.08 -6.65 2.06 3.04 -68.7% -50.1% 14.3% 1 1 1997
Malaysia -0.08 0.04 4.00 0.69 -13.78 0.61 1.08 -71.7% -35.1% 11.0% 0 1 1997
Mexico -0.08 0.07 3.00 0.20 -30.74 5.28 3.40 -26.0% -36.2% 14.6% 1 0 1995
Philippines -0.05 0.10 3.00 0.22 -22.64 0.85 1.44 -61.9% -34.1% 9.6% 1 1 1997
Thailand -0.08 0.09 3.00 0.20 -11.24 1.45 2.21 -79.3% -46.6% 13.0% 1 0 1997
Turkey -0.04 0.09 4.00 0.01 -11.32 2.06 2.26 -40.2% -62.2% 20.2% 1 0 1994
Venezuela -0.03 0.06 3.00 -0.01 -12.09 0.81 1.70 -25.7% -41.5% 14.8% 1 0 1994
Crisis
Mean -0.05 0.07 3.22 0.17 -15.82 1.82 2.31 -0.48 -0.39 0.14 0.89 0.56 -
St. Dev 0.02 0.02 0.67 0.21 8.42 1.40 0.78 0.31 0.17 0.03 0.33 0.53 -
Non-crisis
Mean -0.02 0.03 3.60 0.04 -15.92 0.99 2.17 0.15 -0.09 0.09 0.39 0.19 -
St. Dev 0.07 0.18 0.91 0.20 27.21 1.01 3.07 0.64 0.15 0.05 0.49 0.39 -
T-stat. -2.80 1.72 -1.53 1.70 0.02 1.71 0.30 -4.92 -5.01 3.92 3.95 2.02 -
Data Sources: The political dummy variables are based on election information provided in World Factbook
published by CIA and confirmed by Microsoft's Encarta Encyclopedia.  Radelet and Sachs (1998) provided the
economic variables and crisis definition.
Note: The current account to GDP ratio, the c apital Inflow to GDP ratio, 3 year Change in Credit to GDP ratio,
3 year % change in Real FX rate, Short-term debt to GDP ratio, and total debt to reserve ratio are measured at
the end of last year.




































Cap. Inflow 0.07 -0.9
Corruption -0.14 -0.06 0.05
Credit Exp. 0.20 0.31 -0.33 -0.05
Real FX 0.00 -0.26 0.31 0.31 0.31
ST
Debt/Res
0.24 0.34 -0.37 -0.03 -0.07 -0.25
T. Debt/Res 0.01 0.38 -0.38 0.07 -0.07 -0.21 0.78
Political D. 0.32 -0.10 0.14 -0.09 0.06 -0.04 0.05 -0.04
Contagion 0.28 -0.10 0.08 -0.26 0.16 -0.09 -0.12 -0.06 0.24
Dep. Var
Eq. Ret$ -0.31 0.73 -0.73 -0.03 0.3 -0.29 0.13 0.16 -0.08 -0.15
Devalue -0.53 -0.24 0.29 0.15 -0.34 0.04 -0.26 -0.23 -0.21 -0.24 -0.10
Volatility 0.31 0.53 -0.54 -0.08 0.29 -0.31 0.27 0.20 0.28 0.08 0.46 -0.65
Data Sources: The political dummy variables are based on election information provided in World Factbook
published by CIA and confirmed by Microsoft's Encarta Encyclopedia.  Radelet and Sachs (1998) provided the
economic variables and crisis definition.
Note: The current account to GDP ratio, the c apital Inflow to GDP ratio, 3 year Change in Credit to GDP ratio,
3 year % change in Real FX rate, Short-term debt to GDP ratio, and total debt to reserve ratio are measured at
the end of last year.
